WEBVTT
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On January 8, 2024, a fire broke out in the
engine room aboard the 598 ft long
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stride cargo vessel while it was refueling at
the Barber’s Cut Marine Terminal in La Porte,
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Texas, about 25 miles east of Houston.
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Crew members cut all ventilation to the engine
room to extinguish the fire,
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but not before two crew members, a chief
engineer and a third engineer,
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lost their lives.
Another worker was seriously injured in the
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incident as well.
The vessel was declared a total loss valued at
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$12 million and the operating company, Danaus
Shipping Company,
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which is based in Greece, scrapped the entire
ship.
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According to the NTSB, the fire was traced to
an incorrect valve installed in a pipe leading
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to a diesel oil tank.
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About 6 weeks before the fire, a replacement
valve was ordered for one of the ship’s diesel
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oil tanks.
After the fire, NTSB investigators found that
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the install.
Part was not the same type of valve specified
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by the vessel’s fuel oil system drawing.
Rather than an angle stop valve,
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a similar looking valve, which only allows
diesel oil to flow in one direction,
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even when open, was ordered and installed.
Once diesel oil filled another tank to capacity,
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it was directed up the common vent line rather
than to the intended oil tank where it flowed
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from a small cut out section of the vent pipe
that had been sealed at an unknown time.
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The flexible ceiling and tape covering the
cutout failed,
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and diesel oil started quote cascading onto
operating machinery.
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The NTSB said that due to the extensive area
exposed to the overflowing fuel,
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it was impossible to identify the ignition
source.
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The NTSB couldn’t really nail down when the
patch to the cutout section was made.
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The report said, quote, at some unknown time in
the vessel’s 26 year history,
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a 7 inch by 11 inch section of pipe had been
cut into the top of the vent.
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The Panama flagged ship was made in 1997.
The NTSB’s report stressed that owners,
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operators, and crews should carefully note all
components of the vessel’s drawings and
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diagrams to make sure proper spare or
replacement parts are ordered.
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Another contributing factor was adequate
personnel.
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The NTSB noted that engine crew members were
not monitoring the tank levels as they were
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being filled, a procedure required by the
operating company’s safety management system.
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The company’s fueling procedures require a
minimum of 2 engineering officers and 2 engine
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ratings to be on duty during operations.
At the time of the fire,
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only 3 crew members were involved with
operations.
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I’m David Manti, this is manufacturing now.